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1. Introduction  
Dramatic growth in disability rolls has become an increasing concern for many OECD countries 
(OECD, 2003). Between 1980 and 1999, the share of non-elderly adults receiving disability benefits in 
the United States increased 60 percent to 4.7 percent.1 Across the OECD as a whole, disability 
participation rates increased 36 percent over the period, to 6.4 percent. The growth in disability 
participation rates has important implications in terms of national productivity and the public 
financing of disability benefit programs. In 1999, disability benefit payments comprised 1.4 percent of 
GDP in the U.S. and 2.5 percent of GDP across countries in the European Union. Thus, understanding 
the determinants of disability participation is an increasingly important issue for policy makers.2 
 The current paper investigates the impact of plant downsizing (i.e. reductions in plant 
employment levels) on disability entry rates.3 Downsizing events are an endemic feature of market 
economies, as producers periodically re-optimize in response to changing market conditions. If such 
events have only temporary effects on the productivity of affected workers, it is reasonable to assume 
that the long-term productivity gains outweigh any short-term losses. However, if downsizing events 
increase disability entry rates, the lost production of at least some affected workers might not be short-
term due to hysteresis in disability participation. Only about one percent of disability recipients leave 
the rolls each year due to recovery or work resumption (OECD, 2003, p. 58). As a result, the 
productivity losses associated with downsizing events could be prolonged and quite large, depending 
on the extent that disability entry rates are affected.  
 Downsizing can affect the likelihood of applying for disability through at least two 
different channels: expected future earnings or health. Downsizing typically involves laying off some 
fraction of a plant’s workforce. Assuming there exists some cost associated with re-entering the 
workforce (e.g. job search costs), being “downsized” reduces expected future earnings, lowering the 
opportunity cost of entering disability. Additionally, downsizing could affect workers’ health, leading 
to depression or stress-related health problems. The adverse health effects of downsizing could 
increase the effort cost of remaining in the workforce and/or increase the likelihood a disability 
pension application is successful. 
 We investigate the relationship between plant downsizing and disability participation 
using a comprehensive, longitudinal database containing annual records for every person in Norway, 
                                                     
1 Statistics on disability program use and expenditures obtained from OECD (2003). 
2 Throughout this paper, we employ the colloquial expressions “on disability” and “disability participation” to refer to the 
utilization of disability pension benefits.  
3 By “plant” we are referring to the establishment at which a worker is employed.  Plants are therefore distinct from a 
worker’s firm in cases where a firm operates multiple establishments. 
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combined with a dataset containing employment spell records for workers in all Norwegian plants. 
Merging these datasets, we calculate employment counts by plant and year, allowing us to identify 
workers originally employed in plants that subsequently downsized. Our effect estimates are based on 
comparisons of covariate adjusted disability entry rates across workers originally employed in 
downsizing and non-downsizing plants. Such estimates are potentially biased if downsizing plants are 
concentrated in industries or geographic areas with unusually high (or low) rates of disability entry. 
The richness of our register data allows us to include industry, municipality and neighborhood fixed 
effects to address these sources of bias. We are also able to conduct robustness checks to test for 
unobserved differences across workers in downsizing and non-downsizing plants.    
 Our empirical results suggest that plant downsizing has a substantial effect on the 
disability entry rate of workers in Norway. Workers originally employed in plants that closed between 
1993 and 1998 were 27.9 percent more likely to utilize disability pensions in 1999 than comparable 
workers in non-downsizing plants. We also estimate a large and statistically significant negative 
impact of plant downsizing on workers’ future earnings and likelihood of employment. These findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of plant downsizing on disability entry is driven by its 
effect on expected future earnings. However, our findings also suggest that the downsizing effect on 
disability entry could be driven by its effect on workers’ health. We estimate a large and statistically 
significant impact of plant downsizing on workers’ mortality rates. Workers originally employed in 
plants that close during 1993-1998 have a 15.6 percent increase in mortality rates estimated over 1999-
2002. Moreover, we find that diagnoses of mental disorders, a category capturing depression and 
many stress-related conditions, are more prevalent among disability entrants following downsizing. 
 Interestingly, we find that workers originally employed in plants downsizing 65-95 
percent of their workforce are more likely to enter disability than workers in fully closing plants. This 
non-linear relationship is consistent with the signaling story of Gibbons and Katz (1991). If “partially” 
downsizing plants select to lay off less productive workers, then prospective employers may infer 
these workers to be of lower quality than those laid off due to a plant closure. As a result, workers laid 
off as part of a partial downsizing could face more difficult labor market conditions than workers laid 
off due to a plant closure. Consistent with the signaling story, we find that future earnings and 
likelihood of employment are higher for workers originally employed in closing plants than for those 
in plants downsizing by 65-95 percent.  
 The current paper contributes to a stream of empirical investigations suggesting that 
economic conditions affect disability participation, including two excellent recent studies that appear 
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to establish a causal link (Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002, and Autor and Duggan, 2003).4 Analyzing 
county-level data from coal-producing U.S. states, Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2002) demonstrate that 
the coal boom and subsequent bust had a large impact on disability participation among residents of 
coal-rich counties. Autor and Duggan (2003) find that decreasing demand for low skilled workers 
combined with unforeseen increases in the earning replacement rate substantially increased the 
likelihood low-skilled workers entered disability following an adverse labor market shock.  
 The richness of our dataset allows us to conduct numerous analyses that are new to this 
literature. First, using individual level data we are able to establish a direct link between plant 
downsizing and disability pension entry. Our estimates suggest that the aggregate effect of downsizing 
events (workforce reductions of more than 5 percent) increased disability participation in 1999 by 14.3 
percent among workers employed full-time in 1993. Therefore, the role of plant downsizing in 
disability participation is substantively important. Second, we are able to investigate the plausibility of 
different channels through which the effect of downsizing on disability participation may operate. The 
existing literature generally assumes that adverse economic conditions affect disability entry by 
increasing the earnings replacement rate. Our results support the plausibility of this channel, but also 
indicate that downsizing could increase disability entry by adversely affecting workers’ health. Third, 
we are able to identify a non-linear relationship between plant downsizing and disability entry, a 
finding of practical relevance to policy makers and noteworthy for its consistency with the signaling 
story of Gibbons and Katz (1991).  
 The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the Disability 
Pension program in Norway. Section 3 provides a theoretical framework for understanding the impact 
of plant downsizing on disability entry. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy. Section 5 describes 
our dataset. Section 6 presents and discusses our empirical results, and section 7 concludes.  
2. Disability Pension Program in Norway 
All Norwegian residents and non-resident Norwegian employees are covered under Norway’s 
National Insurance Program.5 Any insured person aged 18 to 67 is entitled to a disability pension if his 
or her “work capacity” is permanently reduced by 50% or more due to illness, injury or defect and the 
person has been insured at least three years immediately before the disability occurs. The disability 
benefit is meant to serve as a replacement for earned income lost as result of the disability. 
                                                     
4 Other important papers in this literature include Parsons (1980), Haveman and Wolfe (1984), Bound (1989), Haveman, De 
Jong, and Wolfe (1991), Bound and Waidman (1992), Rupp and Stapleton (1995), Aarts, Burkhauser, and De Jong (1996), 
Gruber and Kubik (1997), Gruber (2000), and Duggan and Imberman (forthcoming). 
5 Excluded from the program are foreign citizens who are paid employees of a foreign state or international organization. 
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 Disability pensions are comprised of three components: a basic pension, a supplementary 
pension and a special supplement.6 The basic pension is currently set to NOK 58,778 (about 9,000 
U.S. dollars) and adjusted annually to account for changes in prices and aggregate income levels.7 The 
basic pension is reduced by 25 percent if the person's spouse has an income exceeding twice the basic 
pension amount or receives a pension. The supplementary pension is designed to ensure that a 
recipient can maintain a standard of living comparable to the standard he had before becoming 
disabled. This amount is calculated as a complicated (concave and capped) function of prior earnings. 
Thus, the supplementary pension generally increases with prior earnings, but at a decreasing rate. The 
special supplement essentially establishes a minimum for the supplementary pension to ensure that 
each disabled person has a reasonable standard of living. This minimum is calculated as a fixed 
percentage of the basic pension amount, with the percentage varying with family composition. For 
instance, the percentage applied for single persons is 79.33, establishing a minimum supplementary 
pension of NOK 46,629. Thus, a typical single worker who becomes 100 percent disabled is entitled to 
a minimum total annual pension of NOK 105,408 (about $16,600). 
 The total pension amount will be larger for persons with even modest earnings. For 
instance, in 2002 the average annual income for workers in the lowest quintile of the income 
distribution was NOK 240,000. At this income level, a single worker becoming 100 percent disabled is 
entitled to a total pension of NOK 131,709. In addition, pension recipients are allowed to earn up to 
NOK 58,778 while on disability and also pay lower income taxes. Due to concavity in the 
supplementary pension calculation, the earnings replacement rate declines for higher earnings levels.  
 Norway’s disability pension program serves a similar function as the combined disability 
programs of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in 
the U.S. The basic and supplementary pensions provide a benefit that is increasing and concave in 
prior earnings similar to SSDI, and the special supplement ensures a minimum benefit amount similar 
to SSI. An important difference between the Norwegian and U.S. programs is that the Norwegian 
program allows workers to apply for disability pension while still employed. As a result, it is common 
for Norwegian workers to receive “sick money” prior to transitioning from employment onto disability 
                                                     
6 In addition to the basic pension, supplementary pension and special supplement, there are means-tested supplements for 
disability pensioners with a dependent spouse or child. 
7 The basic pension is reduced for beneficiaries with fewer than 40 insurance coverage years (e.g. a person with 20 coverage 
years would receive a basic pension half this amount).  Since all Norwegian employees are covered and coverage years are 
calculated up to the person’s 67th birthday, this reduction only applies to a small fraction of beneficiaries who spent a large 
part of their adult life abroad. 
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without ever being unemployed.8 The replacement rate for low-income earners is also higher in 
Norway than in the U.S.   
3. Theoretical Framework 
The following presents a simple model illustrating how plant downsizing can affect a worker’s 
decision to apply for disability benefits.9 In particular, it demonstrates how downsizing can affect the 
likelihood of applying for disability either by affecting expected future earnings or by affecting health. 
Let a worker’s health be denoted by h, where h is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Let s = {d, w} denote 
the alternative states of drawing a disability pension (d) and being in the workforce (w). Let the utility 
of being in the workforce be denoted by u(e,h), where e is expected earnings. We assume that the 
“effort cost” of work is decreasing in health, so that the utility of working is increasing in both health 
and expected earnings. For simplicity, we assume that the utility of receiving disability benefits has a 
fixed value given by Vd. 10   
 Let C represent the effort cost of filing an application and p(h) the probability of 
application success. We assume that p’<0, reflecting that the likelihood of application success is 
higher for applicants of poorer health. The expected utility from applying for disability can then be 
written as:11 
 
(1) ( )1 ( ) ( , ) ( ) dEU p h u e h p h V C= − + −  
 
Hence, workers maximize expected utility by applying for disability benefits when the following 
condition is met: 
 
(2) ( )( ) ( , )dp h V u e h C− >  
 
Equation (2) says that a worker will apply for disability benefits if the expected net benefit of being a 
disability pension recipient is higher than the application cost.   
                                                     
8 “Sick money” is a temporary benefit that replaces the earnings of incapacitated workers. While receiving sick money, 
recipients cannot be dismissed by their employer and are considered employed for reporting purposes.  
9 This model draws on Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) and Autor and Duggan (2003). 
10 For simplicity, we have assumed that Vd  is independent of health. Our results would prevail even if Vd  was dependent on 
health as long as the net benefit of becoming a disability recipient is decreasing in health.  
11 Recall that the Norway program allows workers to apply for disability pension while employed. 
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 Downsizing often involves laying off some fraction of a plant’s workforce. Let ew and el 
denote future expected earnings of a retained and a laid off worker, respectively. We assume that 
w le e> , reflecting the cost associated with re-entering the workforce following a layoff (e.g. lost 
earnings due to unemployment or having to accept lower wage). This is consistent with the literature 
on job displacement showing that displacement reduces future earnings and likelihood of employment 
(see survey by Kletzer, 1998). Let hw (and hl) denote the level of health at which a retained (and laid 
off) worker is indifferent between applying and not applying for disability benefits. That is, hw and hl 
are defined implicitly by ( ) ( )( ),w d w wp h V u e h C− =  and ( ) ( )( ),l d l lp h V u e h C− = . Note that w lh h<  
follows from w le e> .   
0 
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Figure 1. People’s labor supply choices 
 
 
 Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between worker health, expected earnings, and entry 
onto disability under this simple model. We refer to workers with health wh h<  as unconditional 
applicants since such workers will apply for disability independent of their workforce status (retained 
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versus laid off). A worker with health w lh h h< <  is a conditional applicant, meaning he will apply for 
disability insurance if and only if he is laid off. Finally, a worker with health lh h>  is a non-applicant, 
meaning that he will not apply for disability insurance regardless of being laid off. Recall that h is 
uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Thus, the area A represents the likelihood that a random worker who is 
retained becomes a disability pension recipient, while the area A+B represents the likelihood that a 
random worker who has been laid off becomes a disability pension recipient.  
 In this simple model, downsizing can affect the likelihood of applying for disability either 
by affecting expected future earnings or by affecting health: 
 Expected future earnings: If downsizing forces plants to layoff workers, this increases the 
number of conditional applicants. Figure 1 illustrates how conditional applicants are more likely to 
become disability recipients because of lower expected future earnings ( )l he e< . The literature on job 
displacement (see survey by Kletzer, 1998) suggests that the decrease in expected future earnings is 
larger for workers with more plant specific skills. Thus, area B is likely larger for workers with plant 
specific skills, suggesting these workers are more likely to enter disability following a layoff than 
workers with more general skills. Assuming workers with longer job tenure, lower education levels, 
and older ages have more plant specific skills, we are able to test this implication empirically.  
 If downsizing plants have some discretion with respect to whom they lay off and tend to 
lay off workers of lower productivity, then being laid off can signal low productivity to future 
employers (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). As such, expected future earnings are potentially lower (i.e. el is 
smaller and area B larger) for workers displaced as one of a few than workers displaced as one of 
many. If so, workers displaced because of a partial downsizing are more likely to enter disability than 
those displaced because of a plant closure.  
 Note that downsizing can also decrease expected future earnings of retained workers (i.e. 
ew is smaller and area A larger). Downsizing events may, for example, affect workers’ perceptions 
regarding local labor market opportunities, reducing perceived job security and expectations about 
future wages. These factors can affect retained workers who are on the margin for entering disability. 
 Health effect: Plant downsizing could affect the health of workers. The epidemiological 
literature has linked stress and depression associated with job loss to cardiovascular disease and 
diseases of the digestive system (see survey by Kasl and Jones, 2002). Thus, the stress of experiencing 
a job loss could be a direct cause of disabling health problems. In addition, a recent paper by Snyder 
and Evans (2002) suggests that working has a positive effect on health, measured by differences in 
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mortality rates.12 We find that downsizing has a sizable negative effect on the future labor force 
participation of affected workers, which could adversely affect their health. 
 There is also evidence from the epidemiological literature that downsizing could affect 
the health of retained workers by imposing stress or affecting perceptions of job security (see e.g. 
Dragano, Verde, and Siegrist, 2005, Kivimaki et al., 2000, Vahtera and Kivimaki, 1997). 
Alternatively, the consequence of downsizing may be more work for retained workers, leading to 
physical or mental exhaustion. Notably, Røed and Fevang (2005) find that major downsizing events in 
the Norwegian health care and social services sectors raised the level of sickness-related absenteeism 
among workers in affected institutions.  
 Figure 1 illustrates how adverse health effects resulting from plant downsizing events will 
increase a worker’s likelihood of disability benefit utilization. An adverse health effect (decrease in h) 
will increase the worker’s likelihood of being an unconditional or conditional applicant, as well as 
increase the probability an application is successful.  
4. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the effect of downsizing events on both retained and laid off 
workers. There are two important reasons for this approach. First, there are identification issues in 
estimating the effect of layoffs on disability pension utilization. Workers selected to be laid off are 
likely different in unobservable ways than retained workers. Moreover, our theoretical model suggests 
that downsizing could also affect the disability entry rate of retained workers. For this reason, the 
effect of downsizing events over both laid off and non-laid off workers is probably more relevant to 
policy makers than the effect of layoffs in isolation. As a practical matter, we are also prevented from 
isolating the effect of layoffs because we cannot identify which workers were laid off with any 
precision.13  
 Our dataset allows us to measure plant downsizing by looking at changes in employment 
levels by plant and year. We will refer to the plant downsizing rate (PDR) as the maximum percentage 
                                                     
12 However, a study by Ruhm (2000) found that temporary decreases in employment rates decreased mortality rates.  See 
Ruhm (forthcoming) for an excellent survey on how macroeconomic conditions affect health. 
13 Under Norwegian law, workers must be notified a minimum of one month prior to an impending layoff. 
Workers notified of their impending layoff might enter a new job without ever receiving unemployment and 
would not appear to have been laid off. The problem is even more severe for workers who exit jobs onto 
disability. Since workers commonly receive sick money prior to entering disability, and because workers cannot 
be dismissed from employment while receiving sick money, a worker who intends to enter disability in response 
to an impending layoff will commonly be observed as transitioning directly from employment onto disability. 
There is no way to determine with any precision when such transitions are associated with an impending layoff. 
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reduction in employment between 1993 and 1998. More precisely, the plant downsizing rate in plant k 
is given by 
(3) , ,
,
max   93 98i k j kk
i k
x x
PDR i j
x
⎧ ⎫
−⎪ ⎪
= ≤ < ≤⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
, 
where kix ,  denotes number of workers (full-time equivalents) in plant k at the end of year i.14  
 We estimate the following linear probability model15 for the probability that a worker 
employed full-time in 1993 receives a disability pension in 1999: 
 
(4) ,99 0 ( ) ( )i p i P p i X i iA PDR X X uα η α α= + + + +  
 
where 
Ai,99 ~ indicator that worker i is a disability pension participant in year 1999 
PDRp(i) ~ plant downsizing rate of the plant in which i was employed in 1993 
Xp(i) ~ vector of 1993 characteristics of i’s plant  
Xi ~ vector of 1993 characteristics of i  
ui ~ Error term with mean zero 
 
 The parameter of interest in equation (4) is η, which captures the impact of plant 
downsizing on i’s likelihood of entering disability. Estimation of equation (4) will produce unbiased 
estimates of η provided that plant downsizing events are determined by exogenous economic shocks 
and are independent of unobservable determinants of disability entry. This assumption may be difficult 
to defend for several reasons. For example, some industries may be laying off more workers than other 
industries. If workers are more likely to become disabled in these industries (e.g. heavy industry), 
estimate of η will be biased upwards. Downsizing plants may also be concentrated in neighborhoods 
or municipalities with poor labor market conditions. If so, our estimate of η may capture the effect of 
difficult local labor market conditions on disability entry. Finally, a worker may be more likely to 
enter disability if more of their neighbors are utilizing disability benefits (see e.g. Moffit 1983, 
Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull, 1999, Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan, 2000). If downsizing 
                                                     
14 We also estimated models calculating the PDR as the percentage change in plant employment between 1993 and 1998 (as 
opposed to the maximum percentage reduction).  The estimates produced under these models were very similar to those 
reported here, but slightly less precisely estimated. 
15 Logit models were also estimated (when possible) and produced similar marginal effect estimates. However, we were 
unable to estimate logit models for specifications including neighborhood fixed effects.  
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plants are concentrated in neighborhoods with high disability participation rates, social interaction 
effects in disability participation could bias our estimate of η. In our empirical analysis, we address 
these potential sources of bias by including industry, municipality and neighborhood fixed effects.  
 Estimates of η could also be biased if unobserved determinants of disability entry are 
correlated with the downsizing experience of workers’ plants, for instance, if workers of marginal 
health are concentrated in failing plants. If true, we might expect higher rates of sick money use in 
1992 among workers in downsizing plants. Similarly, we might expect higher rates of disability entry 
among workers in downsizing plants even prior to the downsizing event. We are able to test both of 
these possibilities. 
 Disability entry rates could also vary across plants if adverse health events are correlated 
within plants. For instance, a plant may never recover after a plant accident injuring a lot of workers, 
or a plant may have bad environmental conditions that hurt both its workers’ health and plant 
performance. We investigate this potential source of bias by looking at the diagnoses on which 
workers enter disability. If downsizing is frequently caused by plant-specific “health shocks,” then a 
higher fraction of disability entrants from downsizing plants should enter with an injury- or pollution-
related diagnosis relative to entrants from non-downsizing plants. To investigate this possibility, we 
estimate a worker’s probability of entering disability on a particular diagnosis, restricting the sample 
to those on disability in 1999. For different diagnosis categories, we estimate the following logit 
model: 
 
(5) ( ) ( ),99 0 ( ) ( )Pr 1i p i P p i X iB PDR X Xα γ α α= = Λ + + +  
 
where Bi,99 is an indicator that entrant i has a certain diagnosis (e.g. injury- or pollution-related). If we 
find no significant relationship between plant downsizing and injury- or pollution-related diagnoses, 
this suggests that estimates of η are probably not biased from a higher incidence of “health shocks” in 
downsizing plants.  
 Our diagnosis-related results can also shed some light on the potential health effects of 
downsizing. Certain health conditions (e.g. mental disorders, diseases of the circulatory system) are 
more plausibly affected by downsizing than others (e.g. neoplasms, diseases of the musculoskeletal 
system). If downsizing increases disability entry rates by adversely affecting workers’ health, we 
should expect a higher fraction of disability entrants from downsizing plants entering for the prior 
types of conditions.   
 It should be noted that, absent the sources of omitted variable bias identified above, our 
results potentially under-estimate the impact of downsizing on disability entry since our downsizing 
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measure is based on a worker’s original plant of employment. Job mobility across downsizing and 
non-downsizing plants would therefore tend to attenuate our estimates. 
5. Dataset Description 
Our empirical analysis utilizes two databases provided by Statistics Norway: a register database called 
FD-trygd and an employment spell database. The FD-trygd database contains employment and 
disability pension records for every Norwegian from 1992 to 2000.16 In addition, this database 
contains a rich array of individual demographic and socio-economic variables (e.g. marital status, 
education, income/wealth), as well as geographic identifiers for municipality and neighborhood of 
residence.  
 The employment spell database allows us to calculate the number of employees in any 
given plant at the end of each calendar year. Due to uncertainty regarding the “end date” of 
employment spells, we counted as employed only those persons whose employment status was 
confirmed in FD-trygd.17 The count of workers in each plant-year is based on the number of “full-time 
equivalents” (FTEs), with part-time workers counted as 0.67 FTEs and minor part-time workers 
counted as 0.33 FTEs. From these counts, we derived the downsizing rate for each plant as defined in 
equation (3).18 
 Individuals identified as employed full-time in the FD-trygd database were matched to 
their plant of employment in 1993 to form the basis of our analytic sample.19 A number of exclusion 
criteria were applied to create our final sample of full-time workers. First, since our primary outcome 
is disability participation at the end of 1999, we omitted any workers who died or emigrated prior to 
the end of 1999. Second, we restricted our sample to workers age 30 to 60 in 1993. Disability 
participants are automatically transferred to the elderly pension program at the age of 67, so that 
workers over age 60 in 1993 cannot receive a disability pension in 1999. Third, we excluded those 
with less than one year of tenure in their plant, including any workers receiving assistance in 1993 that 
should have precluded full-time employment (i.e. disability pension, rehabilitation pension, 
unemployment benefits, social assistance). Since the personal income variable in FD-trygd includes 
both earnings and governmental assistance, this restriction ensures that personal income consistently 
captures annual earnings in 1993, though it potentially includes earnings from more than one 
                                                     
16 We are using 1993 as the base year because of missing income variables in 1992.  
17 In FD-trygd, employment status is confirmed by the presence of positive earnings related to the employment spell.   
18 We also estimated models using only the count of full-time workers to construct PDR (as opposed to FTEs). The estimates 
produced under these models were very similar to those reported here, but less precisely estimated.  
19 In some cases, workers appeared to have simultaneous full-time employment spells in more than one plant. In such cases, 
the main plant of employment was selected based on the employment spell with most recent start date.     
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employment source. Fourth, we excluded any workers receiving sick money at the end of 1993, and 
similarly excluded such workers from the annual plant employment counts on which our downsizing 
variables are based. Since workers commonly receive sick money prior to entering disability, failure to 
do this could contribute to spurious correlation between plant downsizing and disability entry.20 
Finally, to reduce noise in our measure of plant downsizing, we restrict our sample to workers 
employed in plants with at least ten FTEs in 1993. 
 Applying the above restrictions provides us a sample of 496,961 workers living in 12,217 
neighborhoods (434 municipalities) and working in each of the 33 different industries.21 Table 1 
presents summary statistics for our sample. Note that the 1999 disability entry rate among workers in 
plants with a low PDR (less than 35 percent) is 4.3 percent, while the disability entry rate among 
workers in high PDR plants is 5.4 percent. Workers employed in high PDR plants differ from those in 
low PDR plants in a number of potentially important dimensions, though the differences are not 
substantively large. Overall, workers in high PDR plants tend to be less well educated, have lower 
incomes and household wealth, and are employed in smaller plants. Workers in low PDR plants tend 
to be somewhat older. The age differences are less than the tenure differences, suggesting that 
employment is historically more stable in low PDR plants. 
                                                     
20 For instance, if workers who exit a plant onto disability are not replaced, a plant with a higher fraction of sick money 
recipients will have a larger downsizing rate when more of those recipients exit onto disability. 
21 Industries are coded at the two-digit level of the Standard Industrial Classification, the industry coding system used by 
Statistics Norway in 1993.    
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
variables all PDR < 35 PDR > 35 
on DP 1999 .046 .043 .054 
female .351 .346 .364 
age    
30-40 .360 .352 .380 
40-50 .391 .397 .376 
50-61 .249 .251 .244 
years of schooling   
less than 9  .355 .348 .376 
9-13  .112 .112 .111 
13-15  .338 .340 .332 
more than 16  .195 .200 .181 
years of tenure    
1-3  .203 .188 .243 
3-5  .147 .149 .143 
5-10  .280 .282 .275 
more than 10  .370 .381 .339 
plant size (workers)   
10-25  .208 .201 .227 
25-50 .177 .179 .173 
50-100  .169 .171 .163 
100-500  .277 .274 .285 
more than 500  .169 .175 .152 
income    
personal income 252721 
(111751) 
254083 
(112658) 
248915 
(109085) 
household 
income 
508225 
(3747687) 
508303 
(3703050) 
508007 
(3869767) 
household 
wealth 
131718 
(6204367) 
133418 
(6269549) 
126963 
(6018409) 
PDR    
less than 5% .250   
5-35% .486   
35-65% .077   
65-95% .037   
95-100% .150   
# observations 496961 366036 130925 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
16 
 In our estimation models, the estimated effect of PDR is captured through inclusion of 
four categorical dummies indicating original employment in a plant downsizing 5-35, 35-65, 65-95, or 
95-100 percent (“fully closed”).22 The PDR coefficients therefore capture the incremental increase in 
disability participation relative to workers in non-downsizing plants (less than 5 percent). Based on 
characteristics in 1993, a large number of individual- and plant-level covariates were included in all 
models: 
− sex and year-of-birth: 62 categories 
− marital status: 4 categories (never married, married, divorced, widowed) 
− number of children: 4 categories (0, 1, 2-3, ≥4) 
− received sick in money in 1993: indicator 
− years of education: 4 categories (<9, 9-12, 13-15, ≥16) 
− years of tenure in plant: 4 categories (1-3, 3-5, 5-10, ≥10)  
− personal earnings: linear and quadratic 
− household income: linear and quadratic 
− household wealth: linear and quadratic 
− plant size: 5 categories (10-25, 25-50, 50-100, 100-500, ≥500) 
− share of plant workers, age ≥50: linear 
− share of plant workers, education ≥16: linear 
− share of plant workers, tenure ≥5: linear 
− share of plant workers, received sick money in 1993: linear 
− mean income of plant workers: linear 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Effect of Plant Downsizing on Disability Pension Entry 
Table 2 presents linear probability (OLS) estimates for the effect of the plant downsizing rate (PDR) 
on the probability a worker originally employed in the plant (in 1993) receives disability benefits in 
1999. Standard errors in Table 2 (and subsequent tables) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and non-
independence of residuals across workers originally employed in the same plant.23 Omitting industry 
                                                     
22 In alternative specifications (not presented), we estimated the effect of downsizing using either continuous PDR covariates 
(linear and quadratic terms) or finer PDR categories. The results from these specifications confirm those presented here. In 
particular, the continuous specification indicated that disability entry rates were highest among workers in plants downsizing 
90-95 percent. Results using finer categories were qualitatively similar to those presented but produced very imprecise 
estimates for several downsizing categories due to the small number of plants in those categories.   
23 Using the “robust cluster(.)” option in Stata 8.0. 
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and geographic fixed effects (see Model 1), we find that working in a plant that closed between 1993 
and 1998 increased the likelihood a worker entered disability by 1.4 percentage points. Interestingly, 
the relationship between the PDR and disability entry is non-linear, with a pronounced “hump” in the 
entry rate for workers in plants downsizing 65-95 percent. We provide further exploration of this 
relationship below. 
 
Table 2. Main results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent variable:  DP recipient in 1999 
PDR    
5-35% .0051** 
(.0010) 
.0056** 
(.0009) 
.0048** 
(.0009) 
.0047** 
(.0009) 
35-65% .0121** 
(.0021) 
.0120** 
(.0021) 
.0107** 
(.0019) 
.0103** 
(.0019) 
65-95% .0274** 
(.0035) 
.0277** 
(.0034) 
.0266** 
(.0032) 
.0267** 
(.0032) 
95-100% .0138** 
(.0015) 
.0117** 
(.0015) 
.0114** 
(.0014) 
.0112** 
(.0014) 
F-test (p-value) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Included covars     
Industry FEs  X X X 
Municipality FEs   X  
Neighborhood FEs    X 
mean .0459 .0459 .0459 .0459 
N 496961 496961 496961 496961 
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 5 and 1 percent level. Robust standard error in parenthesis, corrected 
for non-independent residuals within plant. All estimates adjust for individual and plant 1993 characteristics 
(described in text). F-test refers to test of joint significance for the four PDR coefficients. 
 
 As discussed in section 4, an important concern for our empirical strategy is that 
downsizing events might be concentrated in industries with hazardous work conditions or in 
geographic areas with poor labor market conditions. If so, controlling for industry and geographic area 
effects would be expected to reduce the estimated effect of the PDR covariates. Inclusion of fixed 
effects for industry (see Model 2) has only a modest impact on our estimates, with no significant 
differences across estimates in the two models. Only in the case of fully closing plants does the 
estimate move in the direction consistent with omitted variable bias. Estimates do systematically 
decline in magnitude when municipality or neighborhood fixed effects are included (see Models 3 and 
18 
4), though again the differences are fairly modest. We nonetheless view the estimates including both 
industry and neighborhood fixed effects as our preferred estimates (Model 4). These results suggest 
that disability participation rates are 1.1 percentage points higher among workers originally employed 
in fully closing plants and 2.7 percentage points higher among workers employed in plants downsizing 
65-95 percent. 
 Table 3 reports alternative estimates of the downsizing effect as well as results of several 
robustness tests. For comparison, the first column (Model 1) repeats our preferred estimates from 
Table 2. When the outcome is changed to DP participation in 1998 (Model 2), effect estimates decline 
slightly in magnitude. This would be expected since responses to downsizing events might take time to 
materialize. When the outcome is changed to DP participation in 2000 (Model 3), estimates are similar 
to our original estimates. Models 4 and 5 replicate our preferred model altering the years over which 
PDRs are calculated (calculated over 1993-97 in Model 4 and 1993-96 in Model 5). This has the effect 
of recategorizing some plants experiencing employment declines in latter years. As a result, effect 
estimates are slightly larger in the lower PDR categories and modestly lower in the higher PDR 
categories. Model 6 replicates our preferred model but constructs the PDR categories based strictly on 
the change in plant employment levels (FTEs) between 1993 and 1998. Again, the results are similar 
to our original estimates, though slightly smaller in magnitude.  
 The non-linear effect of downsizing on disability entry is a persistent finding across all 
models, with workers in fully closing plants demonstrating substantially lower disability entry rates 
relative to those in plants downsizing 65-95 percent. We were concerned that this might reflect a 
problem with the employment spell data. For instance, if plant identifiers changed over time for some 
fraction of plants, this would lead us to mis-categorize those plants as fully closing, biasing the 
estimated effect of full closure towards zero. To investigate this possibility, we re-estimated our 
original model dropping workers in fully closing plants where more than 50 percent of the exiting 
workers were subsequently re-employed in the same next plant. The results in Model 7 show that 
dropping workers in these plants had minimal effect on our estimates.  
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 Another potential concern regarding our estimates is that they are driven by disability entry 
from plants with persistently unstable employment levels. It is possible that workers employed in less 
stable plants are different in unobservable ways from those employed in more stable plants, biasing the 
downsizing effect estimates. To investigate this, we restricted our sample to workers in plants with stable 
employment levels over 1993-95, specifically, plants either growing or experiencing no more than 5 
percent downsizing over 1993-95. Over the remaining sample, we then estimated the relationship between 
disability entry and the plant downsizing rates over 1995-98. Model 8 presents the results of this analysis. 
Notably, the estimated effect of originally working in a plant downsizing 65-95 percent is significantly 
and substantially smaller than our original estimate. Overall, though, we cannot conclude that our original 
estimates were biased by workers in unstable plants, since the other PDR estimates remain unchanged or 
grow slightly in magnitude. It does appear, however, that among plants downsizing 65-95 percent, the 
plants that began downsizing earlier had higher rates of disability entry.    
 Model 9 tests whether workers in downsizing plants have similar propensities to enter 
disability as those in non-downsizing plants. If true, workers in downsizing plants should not demonstrate 
increased disability entry rates until the downsizing event occurs. To test this, we again restrict our sample 
to workers in plants with no downsizing prior to 1995, and estimate the relationship between PDR and 
disability participation in 1994 or 1995. The results demonstrate no significant relationship, supporting our 
assumption that unobserved propensities to enter disability are independent of plant downsizing rates.  
 Model 10 provides a similar robustness check, focusing on unobserved differences in health 
across workers in downsizing and non-downsizing plants. Using our full sample, Model 10 estimates the 
relationship between PDR and the probability of receiving sick money in 1992. We find no relationship 
between sick money use in 1992 and the subsequent downsizing rate of a worker’s plant, suggesting no 
unobserved differences in health across downsizing and non-downsizing plants prior to the downsizing 
events. 
6.2. Sub-sample Analyses 
Tables 4-6 investigate the impact of downsizing over different sub-samples of workers under our preferred 
specification. Our theoretical model provides a number of implications in this regard. First, workers who 
respond to a layoff by entering disability are likely those of marginal health. To the extent that age or prior 
use of sick money is associated with poorer health, we therefore expect the downsizing effect to be larger 
among older workers and those with a prior history of sick money use. The same reasoning would also 
predict higher responsiveness to downsizing in more physically demanding jobs, such as manufacturing 
21 
and construction. Second, workers differentially respond to layoffs when the effect of layoffs on future 
employment and earnings is larger. The literature on job displacement indicates that the effect of layoffs 
on future employment and income depends on tenure, education and age (see survey by Kletzer, 1998). 
An important explanation for this result is that people with long tenure, low education and old age have 
more plant-specific human capital (see e.g. Becker 1975) which is lost when a worker is displaced. We 
therefore predict greater responsiveness to downsizing among workers who have longer tenure and less 
education. The effect of downsizing is expected to be less severe among workers in industries involving 
less plant-specific human capital, such as the financial services industry. Third, progressivity in the 
earnings replacement rate suggests that the opportunity cost of exiting the job market to enter disability 
will be lower among low earners. As a result, workers with lower initial earnings are expected to be more 
responsive to downsizing events.     
 Table 4 presents estimates of the downsizing effect broken down along two dimensions: sick 
money use in 1992-93 and income in 1993. Note that in “partially” downsizing plants, the differences 
across sub-samples could be driven by the selection of which workers a downsizing plant lays off. For 
example, a plant undergoing a partial downsizing might selectively layoff its least healthy or least 
productive workers which could exaggerate the difference in estimates across partially closing plants. 
Therefore, the estimated effects of “full closure” (95-100 percent) provide the most meaningful 
comparisons across the sub-samples for analyzing differential effects. We find that workers with a history 
of sick money use are more than twice as likely to respond to plant closure by entering disability. Low 
earners, defined as those with incomes below 225,000 NOK (roughly the median for our sample), are 
more than 50 percent more likely to respond to plant closure by entering disability than those with higher 
incomes.24  
 
                                                     
24 The sick money results also support the hypothesis that less healthy workers are disproportionately affected by partial 
downsizing episodes, as the relative difference in effect estimates is larger in the lower PDR categories. 
22 
Table 4: Estimates for sub-samples: received sick money and earnings 
Dependent variable:  DP recipient in 1999 
 Received sick money 92/93  earnings 
 recipient non-recipient  <225000 >225000 
PDR     
5-35% .0132** 
(.0028) 
.0028** 
(.0008) 
 .0063** 
(.0015) 
.0033** 
(.0009) 
35-65% .0313** 
(.0054) 
.0052** 
(.0017) 
 .0124** 
(.0027) 
.0074** 
(.0019) 
65-95% .0492** 
(.0071) 
.0207** 
(.0031) 
 .0329** 
(.0042) 
.0186** 
(.0034) 
95-100% .0203** 
(.0045) 
.0093** 
(.0013) 
 .0138** 
(.0023) 
.0090** 
(.0015) 
F-test (p-value) .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 
mean .1086 .0322  .0664 .0268 
N 89298 407663  239441 257520 
 Note: * and ** denote significance at the 5 and 1 percent level. Robust standard error in parenthesis, 
corrected for non-independent residuals within plant. All estimates adjust for individual and plant 1993 
characteristics (described in text). F-test refers to test of joint significance for the four PDR coefficients. 
 
 Table 5 presents downsizing effect estimates broken down by age, education and tenure. 
Again, the results for “full closure” represent the most meaningful comparisons for evaluating differential 
effects. Consistent with the literature on job displacement and assumptions about plant-specific human 
capital, we find that the effect of plant closure is strongest for workers of older age, longer tenure and 
lower education level.  
 Table 6 presents estimates broken down along two plant characteristics, industry and plant 
size, to determine if disability entry is more sensitive to downsizing episodes in certain types of plants. 
Our findings suggest that they are. Over the six most heavily populated major industries, disability entry is 
most sensitive to downsizing among workers in manufacturing, construction, and transport, storage and 
communication. The first two of these categories are characterized by physically demanding work. In 
contrast, no significant effects were estimated for the category of finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services. We expected smaller effects for this industry category since the jobs are not physically 
demanding and the skills required for such jobs are likely less plant-specific than in the other industries 
considered. The effect of downsizing on disability entry appears strongest in smaller plants, however, the 
23 
magnitudes are large and statistically significant even for workers in plants employing 100 to 500 FTEs. 
Among the largest plants (>500 FTEs), estimates are somewhat smaller and not statistically significant. 
This finding is somewhat at odds with the plant-specific human capital story, as we might expect a higher 
degree of specialization in the largest plants. However, this finding could also reflect unobservable 
differences in the types of workers originally employed in large plants.     
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6.3. Effect of Plant Downsizing on Employment, Earnings and Health 
The above results suggest that downsizing events increase disability entry rates of affected workers but 
do not indicate the mechanism through which disability entry rates increase. As our theoretical model 
suggests, downsizing could affect disability entry by reducing future expected earnings or by 
adversely affecting health. Determining the relative importance of these mechanisms is complicated 
by the fact that employment outcomes and health are endogenous. That is, if workers in downsizing 
plants have poorer subsequent employment outcomes and poorer health, it is impossible (without 
longitudinal health data) to determine the extent that these outcomes cause one another. The following 
analysis therefore only investigates the plausibility of these two mechanisms in contributing to the 
downsizing effect on disability entry. 
 The first two panels of Table 7 present estimates of the downsizing effect on workers’ 
employment and log income in 1999. We estimate a strong effect of downsizing on the subsequent 
employment of workers in our sample, with full-time employment rates 10.6 percentage points lower 
among workers originally employed in plants downsizing 65-95 percent. Consistent with our disability 
entry results, we find a distinct “hump” in the downsizing effect on subsequent employment. The 
effects are smaller in magnitude but remain very large when disability entrants are omitted from the 
sample. A similar pattern is observed for the estimated effect of downsizing on log income. Not 
surprisingly, the income effects are smaller when the sample is limited to those full-time employed in 
1999. Interestingly, we continue to estimate a negative effect of downsizing on log income even when 
we limit our sample to workers still employed in their 1993 plant, indicating that the negative effect of 
downsizing on future earnings extends to retained workers. The non-linear effect of downsizing on 
future employment outcomes and income is consistent with the signaling story of Gibbons and Katz 
(1991), and suggests that expectations of future earnings contribute to the effect of downsizing on 
disability entry.  
 The remaining panel in Table 7 presents the estimates of the effect of downsizing on 
subsequent mortality rates over the period 1999-2002. Over our entire sample, downsizing 
demonstrates a statistically significant positive effect on the mortality of workers. Again, the “hump” 
prevails, with the estimated mortality effect smaller for fully closed plants than plants downsizing 65-
95 percent. Much of the mortality effect is apparently driven by workers in downsizing plants who 
entered disability, as the estimates decrease in magnitude when disability entrants are omitted. 
Restricting the sample to those employed full-time in 1999, the estimates decrease further and are no 
longer statistically significant. While these findings are supportive of the possibility that downsizing 
directly affects the health of affected workers, we cannot conclude this with any certainty. The 
27 
mortality results appear to be primarily driven by persons suffering poorer work outcomes in 1999, 
with a non-linear pattern similar to the employment results. Thus, the higher mortality rates in 
downsizing plants could reflect the impact of labor force participation on health (as in Snyder and 
Evans, 2002) rather than a direct effect of downsizing on health. 
 Analyzing the diagnoses for which workers enter disability provides another opportunity 
for investigating whether the effect of downsizing on disability entry is plausibly explained by a direct 
health effect, as certain health conditions are more plausibly associated with downsizing than others. 
Table 8 presents logit (odds-ratio) estimates for the probability a disability participant entered with a 
given diagnosis.25 Results for the seven most common diagnoses are presented.26 If downsizing 
increases disability participation by adversely affecting health, we would expect to observe a 
disproportionate share of disability entrants from downsizing plants diagnosed for “mental and 
behavioral disorders” and “diseases of the circulatory system.” The former of these captures a number 
of conditions related to stress and depression, potentially affected by job loss. The epidemiological 
literature has linked stress and depression associated with job loss to heart disease (Kasl and Jones, 
2002), captured by the latter category. Our results partially support the hypothesis that downsizing 
events have a direct adverse effect on health, with a significantly higher fraction of disability entrants 
from downsizing plants having been diagnosed with a mental or behavioral disorder. However, no 
such difference was observed for diseases of the circulatory system.  
 An alternative interpretation for the relatively high fraction of mental disorders among 
entrants from downsizing plants is that such diagnoses are more easily manipulated by workers, and 
might therefore be indicative of system “abuse” by workers not truly disabled. If entrants from 
downsizing plants were engaging in such abuse, we would also expect a relatively higher fraction of 
disability entrants from downsizing plants to enter for “diseases of the musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissue,” the category that includes conditions such as rheumatism. The extent that such 
conditions impede work depends entirely on the amount of pain suffered by the worker – something a 
physician cannot observe and therefore potentially subject to manipulation. Of particular concern 
within this category is the diagnosis of fibromyalgia, characterized by muscle pain and fatigue but 
devoid of objectively verifiable symptoms. However, we find no evidence that disability entrants from 
downsizing plants are more commonly diagnosed with fibromyalgia or other musculoskeletal 
                                                     
25 These models were estimated without municipality or neighborhood fixed effects. Logit models could not be estimated 
with neighborhood fixed effects. Including municipality fixed effects produced estimates similar to those presented but led to 
a large number of dropped observations (i.e. when no entrants from a given municipality were associated with a particular 
diagnosis category).   
26 The diagnosis categories were defined by “chapters” in the International Classification of Diseases (10th revision). 
28 
system/connective tissue conditions. Thus, the increase in mental and behavioral conditions associated 
with downsizing appears to capture an adverse health effect rather than system abuse. 
 Finally, our downsizing estimates are potentially biased if plant downsizing events are the 
result of plant-specific “health shocks.” In particular, dangerous work conditions or poor air quality in 
a plant could contribute to both higher rates of disability entry and declines in plant employment, 
leading to biased estimates of the downsizing effect. However, we find no evidence that disability 
entrants from downsizing plants were more likely to enter with an injury-related diagnosis. The 
evidence for “diseases of the respiratory system” is mixed. A significantly higher than expected 
fraction of entrants from plants downsizing 65-95 percent were diagnosed with a respiratory condition, 
and a significantly lower fraction from plants downsizing 35-65 percent. Overall, then, it does not 
appear that our estimates are driven by plant-specific health shocks, though such shocks could 
potentially be biasing the estimated effect associated with plants downsizing 65-95 percent.  
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of plant downsizing on disability pension entry rates in 
Norway. Our results suggest that plant downsizing substantially increases the likelihood of disability 
pension entry by workers in affected plants. Plant closure between 1993 and 1998 increased a 
worker’s likelihood of receiving a disability pension in 1999 by 27.9 percent. Our estimates suggest 
that the aggregate effect of downsizing events increased disability participation in 1999 by 14.3 
percent among workers employed full-time in 1993. Thus, downsizing events appear to play an 
important role in determining aggregate disability participation rates. Indeed, our estimates likely 
understate the impact of downsizing on disability entry since our downsizing variable is based on 
workers’ original plant of employment. Of particular interest, we find that the relationship between 
plant downsizing and disability entry is non-linear. Workers originally employed in plants downsizing 
65-95 percent of their workforce were more likely to enter disability than workers in fully closing 
plants.  
 At least some of the downsizing effect on disability entry appears to be driven by an 
adverse effect of downsizing on expected future earnings. Plant downsizing was associated with 
substantial reductions in workers’ future earnings and likelihood of employment. These effects were 
also non-linear, with workers originally employed in plants downsizing 65-95 percent demonstrating 
worse labor market outcomes than those in fully closing plants. The non-linear effect on earnings and 
employment is consistent with the signaling story of Gibbons and Katz (2001). If downsizing plants 
have discretion over whom to lay off, prospective employers may infer that a worker displaced as one 
of a few is of lower productivity than a worker displaced as one of many. As a result, workers 
displaced due to a partial downsizing may face poorer employment opportunities than workers 
displaced due to plant closure, reducing their opportunity cost of exiting the workforce relative to 
workers in closing plants. This can explain the non-linear relationship between plant downsizing and 
disability entry. 
 However, we also find that downsizing has an adverse effect on workers’ health. Among 
workers observed entering disability, those originally employed in downsizing plants were more likely 
to be diagnosed with mental and behavioral conditions, plausibly related to the stress of job 
displacement. Moreover, we estimate significant effects of downsizing on mortality. Interestingly, the 
non-linear relationship referred to above prevails in the mortality estimates. Job displacement has been 
linked to both stress and depression (Kletzer 1998). The non-linearity may reflect that it is and it is 
more stressful or depressing to lose your job as one of a few than as one of many. Alternatively, it 
32 
suggests that the adverse health effect of downsizing could be related to the poor employment 
outcomes of workers in downsizing plants (Snyder and Evans, 2002). 
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Appendix A 
Coding of Diagnosis 
The dataset contains International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes for all disability pension 
recipients. Disability pension entries prior to December 1998 are coded with ICD9. Entries in 
December 1998 and thereafter are coded with ICD10. In Table 8, we report results for the seven most 
common diagnosis categories on which people entered onto disability pension during 1998 and 1999. 
These categories were defined based on chapters in the ICD10. The specific diagnosis codes within 
each category are listed in the table below.  
 
Table A1: Coding of Diagnosis 
Title of chapter/diagnosis (from ICD10) ICD10 ICD9 
ChapterII: Neoplasms C00-D48 140-239 
ChapterV: Mental and behavioral disorders F00-F99 290-319 
Chapter VI: Diseases of the nervous system G00-G99 320-359 
Chapter IX: Diseases of the circulatory system I00-I99 390-459 
Chapter X: Diseases of the respiratory system J00-J99 460-519 
Chapter XIII: Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissue M00-M99 710-739 
- Fibromyalgia M790 7290 
Chapter XIX: Injury, poisoning and certain other consequences 
of external causes S00-T98 800-999 
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